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A POISONED CHALICE: THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DEFECTS
OF THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL
Kevin Jon Heller*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 7, 1993, Pierre-Richard Prosper, the U.S. Ambassador-at-
Large for War Crimes, announced that the Iraqi government would assume
primary responsibility for prosecuting the innumerable war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and acts of genocide that Saddam Hussein committed
during his three decades of bloody rule.' Human rights groups, who had
hoped-and perhaps even expected-that Saddam would be tried by either
an ad hoc or a hybrid international tribunal, immediately criticized the deci-
sion. Human Rights Watch, for example, argued that a domestic trial would
be a mistake, noting that the Iraqi judiciary had been "deeply compromised"
by years of Ba'ath Party rule and did not have the capacity to handle the
complicated trials Saddam's crimes would require. Amnesty International
agreed, noting its long-standing concerns about Iraq's "widespread human
rights violations relating to the criminal justice system."3
Such skepticism, it turns out, was fully warranted. Before the trial
even began, the president of Iraq publicly announced that Saddam had "con-
fessed" to his crimes.4 One judge of the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) resigned
Lecturer, University of Auckland Faculty of Law. J.D. 1996, Stanford Law School;
M.A. 1993, Duke University, M.A. 1991, New School for Social Research. Thanks are due
to the many people with whom I have discussed the trial and this essay, particularly Mark
Ellis, Michael Scharf, David Crane, Michael Newton, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Mark Drumbl,
Nehal Bhuta, Robert Cryer, William Schabas, and Kenneth Roth. I would also like to thank
Jessica Lawrence for her superb research and editing; this essay could not have been written
without her.
See generally Amnesty Int'l, Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression, Al Index MDE
14/10/99, Nov. 24, 1999; HUMAN. RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KuRDs (1993); Charges Facing Saddam Hussein, BBC NEWS, (July
1, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3320293.stm.
2 Human Rights Watch, Letter to U.S. Regarding the Creation of a Criminal Tribunal for
Iraq, April 15, 2003, http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/iraqtribunalO415031tr.htm.
' Amnesty Int'l, Iraq: Ensuring Justice for Human Rights Abuses, at 4, Al Index
MDE/14/080/2003, Apr. 11, 2003.
4 See John F. Bums, For Saddam, Tribunal Finds Itself on Trial, INT'L. HERALD TRIB.
(Paris), Oct. 19, 2005, at 10.
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because the government was undermining his independence,5 and another
was removed for being a member of the Ba'ath Party-a claim that not even
the chief prosecutor believed, and which was later withdrawn.6 The Tribunal
added new charges against the defendants in the middle of trial.7 A number
of witnesses for the defense were prevented from testifying, and two who
did testify were later beaten into recanting their testimony and charged with
perjury.8 The Tribunal flatly ignored defense motions, including one that
sought disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence.9 The defense was not
even given an authoritative version of the IHT Statute and Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence prior to trial.'"
These criticisms, however, are only half of the story. A trial is only
as fair as the substantive and procedural law that it applies; if either or both
violate due process, a defendant's trial will be unfair no matter how deco-
rously it is conducted. Indeed, in the context of a tribunal like the IHT,
which is intended to hear multiple cases over a period of many years, the
underlying substantive and procedural law is arguably more important than
the fairness of any individual trial. Although trial conduct in general can be
improved by appointing better judges, substantive and procedural reform
requires legislative action, a slow and unpredictable process in the best of
circumstances and one that may be nearly impossible in a political environ-
ment as troubled as Iraq's.
In the wake of Saddam's first trial, then, it is critical to ask whether
the IHT's substantive and procedural law satisfies the requirements of inter-
national due process. As we shall see, in numerous important respects the
answer to that question is an emphatic "no."
Before proceeding, two caveats are in order. First, this essay exam-
ines the IHT's substantive and procedural law solely in relation to the re-
quirements of international due process; it does not compare them to the
traditional requirements of Iraqi criminal law. Although the latter compari-
son is equally important, it requires an understanding of Iraqi criminal law
that I do not possess. Suffice it to say here that many aspects of the IHT
violate not only international due process, but also-as M. Cherif Bassiouni
5 See Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail: The First Trial Before the Iraqi High Tribu-
nal, at 41, Vol. 18, No. 9(E) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail] (Nov. 2006),
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/iraq I 106/iraq 1106web.pdf.
6 Id. at 39.
Id. at 47.
See Hussein Witnesses Jailed, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2006, at A20.
See Sinan Salaheddin, Saddam's Defense Complains About Trial, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Russ.), June 13, 2006, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?actionid=2&story_id=
17900.
" See Human Rights Watch, The Former Iraqi Government On Trial, at 14, Oct. 16, 2005,
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq 1005/iraq 1005.pdf.
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has eloquently pointed out-Iraqi criminal law's thoroughgoing positiv-
ism."
Second, the fact that this essay focuses on the IHT's weaknesses
should not be taken to mean that the Tribunal has no strengths. On the con-
trary, insofar as the IHT incorporates many of the best elements of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the Tribunal's substantive and procedural law repre-
sent a significant advance over some of the more problematic aspects of
traditional Iraqi criminal justice. 2 The intent of this essay, therefore, is con-
structive as well as critical-not simply to identify problems with the IHT,
but also to suggest ways in which its substantive and procedural law could
be improved.
II. INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS
Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) provides that any person charged with a criminal offense is
entitled to "a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and im-
partial tribunal established by law."" A fair trial, in turn, is defined by Arti-
cle 14(3) as one that guarantees a defendant, at a minimum, the following
rights:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he under-
stands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence
and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him,
in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special
Tribunal, 38 CORNELL J. INT'L L. 327, 378 (2005).
12 See, e.g., Yuval Shany, Does One Size Fit All? Reading the Jurisdictional Provisions of
the New Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute in the Light of the Statutes of International Criminal
Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 338, 338-39 (2004).
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(1), adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S.171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; cf
Qanoon Al-Mahkamat AI-Jeena'eyyat AI-Eraqiyyat Al-Mukhtas [Statute of the Iraqi High
Tribunal] art. 19, Oct. 18, 2005, available at www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_
statuteofficial english.pdf (Iraq).(guaranteeing all defendants a "just fair trial").
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(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 4
Article 14, in short, establishes the basic requirements of international due
process. The Republic of Iraq ratified the ICCPR in 1971, obligating the
government to ensure that all of its courts, including the IHT, "give effect to
the rights recognized" by the treaty. 5
What follows is a systematic comparison between the IHT's sub-
stantive and procedural law-which includes, by reference, the Iraqi Penal
Code of 196916 and the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure 7-and the re-
quirements of Article 14. The essay will also refer, where appropriate, to the
provisions of human rights conventions similar to the ICCPR, such as the
European Convention on Human Rights; to illustrative international human
rights instruments like the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judi-
ciary; and to the substantive and procedural law of the ad hoc tribunals and
the ICC. The latter sources are not binding on Iraq, but are nevertheless
indicative of how the ICCPR's more general provisions should be inter-
preted."
III. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
There are two main problems with the substantive law applied by
the IHT. First, because the Tribunal's temporal jurisdiction extends back to
1968, its subject-matter jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against
humanity likely violates the principle of non-retroactivity. Second, the
vagueness of the domestic crimes included within the Tribunal's subject-
matter jurisdiction violates the principle of specificity.
A. The Retroactivity Problem
Article 1 of the IHT Statute gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over, in-
ter alia, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed between July
17, 1968, and May 1, 2003.'" Both crimes are expansively defined: Article
12 prohibits all of the crimes against humanity contained in Article 7 of the
'4 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3).
, Id. art. 2(2).
16 Alwaqai Aliraqiya [The Official Gazette of the slamic Republic of Iraq], The Iraqi Penal
Code, Sept. 15, 1969, No. 1778, unofficial English translation available at http://law.case.
edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi PenalCode_ 1969.pdf.
17 Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure, Law No. 23 of 1971, [hereinafter ICCP] available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IraqiCriminalProcedureCode.pdf.
IS See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WHAT IS A FAIR TRIAL? A BASIC GUIDE
To LEGAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICE 2 (2000), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
pubs/descriptions/fairtrial.pdf.
'9 See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 1(2).
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Rome Statute, omitting only enforced sterilization and apartheid,20 while
Article 13 prohibits all of the war crimes contained in Article 8 of the ICC
Statute.2
Although the IRT deserves credit for its forward-looking approach
to international criminal law, its decision to apply crimes against humanity
and war crimes retroactively to 1968 is problematic. Article 15 of the
ICCPR provides that "[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence
on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal of-
fence, under national or international law, at the time when it was commit-
ted., 22 This non-retroactivity principle has long been considered one of the
"cornerstone principles of criminal law" and is found in nearly all of the
world's legal systems.23 The principle is also specifically enshrined in Arti-
cle 10 of the new Iraqi Constitution.24
Herein lies the problem: a compelling case can be made that at least
some of the crimes prohibited by Articles 12 and 13 of the IHT Statute were
not criminal under either international law or domestic Iraqi criminal law
until the early 1990s.
1. Crimes Against Humanity
The primary problem with Article 12 is that it does not require a
nexus between crimes against humanity and armed conflict,25 thus permit-
ting the Tribunal to prosecute such crimes even if they were committed dur-
ing peacetime. Customary international law, however, did not "indisputa-
bly" criminalize peacetime crimes against humanity until the ICTY's Tadic
decision in 1995. As Cassese says:
It is probably with the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statu-
tory Limitations that the process of a gradual crystallization in interna-
tional customary law of a rule proscribing crimes against humanity even in
20 See Ilias Bantekas, The Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity, 54 INT'L
& COMP.L.Q. 237, 243 (2005).
21 See id.
2 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 15(1).
" Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 373.
Constitution of the Islamic Republican of Iraq, art. 19 (Ninth) [2005] ("Criminal law
does not have a retroactive effect, unless it is to the benefit of the accused.").
25 Cf. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 5, May
25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at http://www.un.org/icty/
legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf. ("The International Tribunal shall have the power
to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population.")
(emphasis added).
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time of peace was set in motion. This crystallization became indisputable
after being established in 1995 by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY.26
Prior to 1995, in other words, crimes against humanity were only illegal
under customary international law when committed during an armed con-
flict, whether international or internal in character. Such crimes were also
not criminal under domestic Iraqi criminal law prior to the enactment of the
IHT Statute; the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 did not recognize them.27 The
IlT, therefore, cannot prosecute a defendant for crimes against humanity
committed during peacetime prior to 1995 without violating the principle of
28
non-retroactivity.
If this interpretation of Article 12 is correct, it has profound impli-
cations. Most obviously, it means that the Dujail trial as a whole was inva-
26 Antonio Cassese, Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity and Non-
Retroactivity of Criminal Law, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 410, 414 n. 5 (2006); see also Andrew
Clapham, Issues of Complexity, Complicity, and Complementarity: From the Nuremberg
Trials to the Dawn of the International Criminal Court, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE:
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43 (Phillippe Sands, ed., 2003) (noting
that "the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals have clearly established that crimes against
humanity exist as self-standing crimes ... that can be prosecuted even in the absence of an
armed conflict"); Timothy L.H. McCormack, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 184 (Dominic McGoldrick et
al. eds., 2004) (noting that, "at least until the early 1990s, uncertainty about the need for
crimes against humanity to be perpetrated in the context of armed conflict prevailed"); cf
Shany, supra note 12, at 344 ("[F]or the purposes of the IST, it is unclear whether, under pre-
1990s international law, crimes against humanity did not require nexus to an armed con-
flict.").
27 See Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 373 (noting that the IHT "borrowed the definition of
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes from the ICC Statute arti-
cles 6, 7, and 8, which are not contained in the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code").
28 Cf Bantekas, supra note 20, at 241-42 ("[T]he application of the concept of crimes
against humanity... as formulated in the latter part of the 1990s to events taking place in the
late 1960s until the early 1990s, may offend the jus cogens principle prohibiting the em-
ployment of retroactive criminal legislation."). Bassiouni suggests that this conclusion might
be avoided for crimes against humanity that have counterparts in Iraqi criminal law: "An
alternative approach to avoiding a violation of the principle of legality is to divide ... crimes
against humanity... into several lesser crimes that are usually found in most domestic crimi-
nal codes, including the 1969 Criminal Code and the 1940 Military Penal Law .... Accord-
ingly, it would be appropriate to refer to these crimes, which are defined in Iraqi law, and to
rely on them as elements of" the various crimes against humanity. Bassiouni, supra note 11,
at 376. Bassiouni admits, however, that such a "substantive justice" interpretation of the
principle of legality is more difficult to defend for crimes against humanity than for war
crimes, because the former have never been included in a specialized convention binding on
Iraq. Id. at 375. It is also not clear whether the substantive justice approach to the legality
principle is still valid; although that approach was embraced by the Nuremberg Tribunal,
Cassese argues that strict legality has replaced substantive justice as the foundation of the
principle. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 143 (2003). If Cassese is
correct, the Iraqi Penal Code's failure to prohibit "crimes against humanity" as an independ-
ent category of crimes would be dispositive. See id. at 143.
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lid, because all of the charges against Saddam and his co-defendants in-
volved crimes against humanity committed in peacetime prior to the
1990s.29 And it also means that, going forward, the Tribunal can only charge
defendants with two categories of crimes against humanity: (1) those that
were committed at any time during an armed conflict and (2) those that
were committed during peacetime after 1995.
2. War Crimes
A similar retroactivity problem affects Article 13. Paragraphs 3 and
4 of Article 13 criminalize serious violations of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and other "serious violations of the laws and customs
of war" even when committed in an "armed conflict not of an international
character., 30 But as Roman Boed has pointed out:
Until the establishment of the two United Nations tribunals, the ICTR and
the ICTY, the customary law position on individual criminal responsibility
for serious violations of humanitarian law during internal armed conflicts.
. [was that] such acts were not considered to be criminal on the interna-
tional plane.3'
Bill Schabas agrees-and notes that "[u]ntil the adoption of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 955 creating the Rwanda Tribunal, it was widely believed
among specialists in international humanitarian law that the very concept of
war crimes in non-international armed conflict did not exist."32 Indeed, no
less an authority than the International Committee of the Red Cross took the
position that, prior to the creation of the ICTY, "the notion of war crimes
[was] limited to situations of international armed conflict."'33
" See Indictments of Saddam's Co-Defendants in SADDAM ON TRIAL 266, 266-82 (Mi-
chael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006).
3 Compare Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, arts. 13(3)&(4); with Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135. Paragraph 3 does not use the expression "serious violations of Common Arti-
cle 3," but the content of the paragraph, as well as the fact that it otherwise follows Article 7
of the ICC Statute, makes clear that it is referring to such violations. Statute of the Iraqi High
Tribunal, art. 13(3).
" Roman Boed, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations ofArticle 3 Common to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Additional Protocol 11 Thereto in the Case Law of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 CRIM. L. F. 293, 299 (2002); see also
Bantekas, supra note 20, at 241-42 ("[T]he application of the concept of... internal conflict
war crimes, as formulated in the latter part of the 1990s to events taking place in the late
1960s until the early 1990s, may offend thejus cogens principle prohibiting the employment
of retroactive criminal legislation.").
32 William Schabas, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, II ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA, 1994-1999, cmt. at 550 (2001).
33 See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 559 (1995) (citation omitted).
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If this interpretation is correct, the principle of non-retroactivity
prohibits the IHT from prosecuting a defendant for war crimes committed
during an internal armed conflict prior to 1994, because war crimes were no
less foreign to Iraqi criminal law than crimes against humanity prior to the
enactment of the IHT Statute.34 This limitation would not affect the Dujail
trial, which involved only crimes against humanity. But it does mean that,
in future trials, the Tribunal can only charge defendants with two categories
of war crimes: (1) those that were committed at any time during an interna-
tional armed conflict; and (2) those that were committed in an internal
armed conflict after 1994.
B. Vagueness of Domestic Crimes
In addition to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide,
the IHT has jurisdiction over three domestic Iraqi crimes: (1) "intervention
in the judiciary or the attempt to influence the functions of the judiciary";
(2) "[t]he wastage or squander of national resources"; and (3) "[t]he abuse
of position and the pursuit of policies that were about to lead to the threat of
war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country."3 Those
crimes are not contained in the Iraqi Penal Code,36 nor are they defined in
the IHT Statute." Instead, they are based on Iraq's Law No. 7 of 1958. Law
No. 7, however, does not define the three domestic crimes 38-which means
that they clearly violate the principle of specificity that is a necessary corol-
lary of the legality principle.39 Cassese again:
Under the principle of specificity, criminal rules must be as specific and
detailed as possible, so as to clearly indicate to their addressees the con-
duct prohibited, namely both the objective elements of the crime and the
• . 40
requisite mens rea.
Each of the domestic crimes "lacks precision and is too general to provide a
safe yardstick for the work of the Tribunal."4' Not only are they so vaguely
worded that a perpetrator could not know in advance what conduct they
prohibit,42 neither the IHT Statute nor Law No. 7 specify the mens rea nec-
essary for their commission."
See Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 373.
3 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 14(1)-(3).
36 See Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 377.
37 See Human Rights. Watch, The Former Iraqi Government on Trial, supra note 10, at 4.
38 Id.
39 See M. CHERIF BAssIouNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 179
(2003).
'o Cassese, supra note 26, at 14.
41 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment 563 (Jan. 14, 2000).
42 See Andreas L. Paulus, Peace Through Justice? The Future of the Crime ofAggression
in a Time of Crisis, 50 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 31-32 (2005) (noting that "the Iraqi crime [of
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IV. PROCEDURAL LAW
Numerous aspects of the IHT's procedural law also violate interna-
tional standards of due process. Some of those violations are created by the
IHT Statute itself; others result from the fact that Article 16 makes the Iraqi
Code of Criminal Procedure "an indivisible and integral part of the law.""
A. Pre-Trial
1. The Right to Counsel
As Christoph Safferling has pointed out, the right to counsel during
the pre-trial phase of a criminal case is a critical element of international
due process:
[T]he safeguarding of human rights during the pre-trial stage is important
because the whole inquiry is intended to determine the legal and factual
basis for trial by obtaining evidence and preparing court procedure. The
foundations for potential conviction are being laid here. It is a crucial stage
for the suspect .... Therefore, already at this stage, the suspect must be as-
sisted by legal counsel.45
It is not completely clear how early in the pre-trial process the right
to counsel attaches. The ICCPR does not provide a definitive answer; it
simply provides for counsel during "the determination of any criminal
charge against" a person."6 Based on his review of the relevant decisions by
international and national courts, Safferling concludes that the ICCPR most
likely requires counsel as soon as a suspect is questioned by the police at a
aggression] is poorly drafted and outdated" and fails to "clearly define the actus reus of the
crime.").
43 See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 16. Although it draws heavily on the ICC, the
IHT Statute does not contain a counterpart to Article 30 of the ICC Statute, which provides a
default mental element of intent and knowledge for all crimes, "unless otherwise provided."
See id; Nor, insofar as similar crimes exist at the international level-such as aggression-
can the IHT give content to the domestic crimes by "resort[ing] to the relevant decisions of
the international criminal courts." Article 17 of the IHT Statute does not allow such reference
for Article 14. Article 17 does allow the IHT to refer to other Iraqi penal laws "[i]n case a
stipulation is not found in this Law and the rules made thereunder," id. art. 17(1), but those
laws-the Baghdadi Penal Law of 1919, the Penal Law No. 111 of 1969, and the Military
Penal Law No. 13 of 1940-also fail to specify a mens rea for the domestic crimes.
" Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal. Interestingly, the December 10, 2003 version of the
IHT Statute provided only that the Tribunal "shall be guided by the Iraqi Criminal Procedure
Law," implying that, in case of conflict, the Statute would take precedence. See IHT Statute
(Dec. 10, 2003), art. 16. Had the current version retained that language, many of the prob-
lems discussed below might have been avoided.
4 CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 106
(2001).
' See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3).
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police station, and categorically requires it once the suspect is arrested or
detained. 7 The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers support the latter
standard: Principle No. 5 requires governments to inform suspects of their
right to counsel "upon arrest or detention.'"" By contrast, the ILC Draft
Statute and the ICC Statute both guarantee the right to counsel even earlier,
during any interrogation of a person suspected of having committed a crime,
regardless of whether he has been arrested or detained. 9
At a minimum, then, international due process requires that suspects
be allowed counsel as soon as they are arrested or detained-and perhaps
even earlier, during any kind of police questioning. Regardless of which
standard is correct, the IHT's right-to-counsel provisions are inadequate.
The IHT Statute and Rules guarantee counsel only in three situations: (1)
when a suspect is questioned by the investigative judge" (2) after an inves-
tigative judge has ordered the suspect provisionally detained'; and (3) dur-
ing arraignment. 2 Moreover, the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure does not
entrust the power to detain and interrogate solely to the investigative judge;
47 See SAFFERLING, supra note 45, at 107.
48 Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Aug.
27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Principle No. 5, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcomp44.htm [hereinafter Basic Principles on Law-
yers].
49 See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, art. 26(6), 88 AJIL 140 (1994)
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/741994.
pdf [hereinafter ICC Statute] ("[a] person suspected of a crime under this Statute shall... (a)
Prior to being questioned, be informed that the person is a suspect and of the rights ... (ii)
To have the assistance of counsel of the suspect's choice or, if the suspect lacks the means to
retain counsel, to have legal assistance assigned by the Court."); Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 55(2), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. ("Where
there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court and that person is about to be questioned either by the Prosecutor, or by national au-
thorities pursuant to a request made under Part 9, that person shall also have the following
rights of which he or she shall be informed prior to being questioned... (c) To have legal
assistance of the person's choosing, or, if the person does not have legal assistance, to have
legal assistance assigned to him or her.").
50 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EviD. 27(1)(a) [hereinafter IT Rules], R. 27(l)(a) ("A
suspect who is questioned by an Investigative Judge shall have the following rights of which
he must be informed by the Investigative Judge prior to questioning in a language he speaks
and understands .... The right to legal assistance of his own choosing, including the right to
have legal assistance provided by the Defence Office if he does not have sufficient means to
pay for it.").
" Id. R. 25(Third) ("The suspect shall be brought without delay, before the Investigative
Judge who made the initial detention order, or before another Investigative Judge assigned by
the Chief Investigative Judge. The Investigative Judge must be convicted [sic] that the right
of the accused to counsel is respected.").
52 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 20(3) ("The Criminal Court shall read the indict-
ment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected and guaranteed, insure that the
accused understands the indictment, with charges directed against him and instruct the ac-
cused to enter a plea.").
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on the contrary, the same powers can be exercised by a variety of different
state actors-and can be exercised long before the investigative judge gets
personally involved in the case.
Critical, here, is the fact that Iraqi criminal procedure distinguishes
between "[i]nvestigations conducted by the [p]olice"" and "the initial inves-
tigation" conducted by an investigative judge.5" The police are the first gov-
ernment agents to investigate a crime, and one of their responsibilities is to
"orally question the person about the accusation made against him."55 They
are also empowered to apprehend a suspect for delivery to the appropriate
authorities.56
It is not clear whether the police are permitted to interrogate a sus-
pect after they have arrested him. Nothing in the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure requires interrogation to cease after arrest, however, and the Code spe-
cifically permits the police to "forbid those present to leave or move away
from the scene of the offence until an official record has been made"-a
limitation on the suspect's freedom that would almost certainly qualify as
detention.57 It is thus likely that the police are, in fact, permitted to continue
to interrogate suspects after they have been arrested or detained-a clear
violation of international due process, given that neither the IHT Statute and
Rules nor the Code of Criminal Procedure require the suspect be provided
counsel for those interrogations.
After a suspect has been arrested and delivered to the appropriate
authorities, investigative responsibility shifts from the police to the investi-
gative judge.5" The IHT Rules would appear to guarantee the suspect the
right to counsel during this new stage of the investigation; Rule 27 specifi-
cally provides that "[a] suspect who is questioned by an Investigative Judge
53 ICCP, supra note 17, ch. 3.
'Id. para. 5 1 (A).
55 Id. para. 43 ("When an investigating officer, within his area of competence as specified
in paragraph 39 is informed or becomes aware that an offence has been committed in the
presence of witnesses, he is required to notify the examining magistrate and the Public
Prosecutor's Office of the occurrence of the offence, to go immediately to the place where
the offence occurred, to take down in writing a statement from the victim of the offence, to
orally question the person about the accusation made against him."). The ICCP defines "in-
vestigating officer" as, inter alia, a police officer, a police station commander, or a commis-
sioner. See idpara. 39.
6 Id. para. 41 ("Investigating officers are authorized within their areas of competence to
inquire into offences and.., to apprehend those who committed the offences and to deliver
them to the appropriate authorities.").
" Id., but cf Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991) (noting that, for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes, "a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would believe that he or she is
not free to leave").
58 See ICCP, supra note 17, para. 5 1. The Code of Criminal Procedure uses the term "ex-
amining magistrate" instead of "Investigative Judge." See, e.g., id., para. I(A) ("The initia-
tion of criminal proceedings for an oral or written complaint is submitted to the examining
magistrate.").
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shall have ... [t]he right to legal assistance of his own choosing, including
the right to have legal assistance provided by the Defence Office."
Appearances, however, can be deceiving: Iraqi criminal procedure
does not require investigative judges to question suspects themselves. On
the contrary, Paragraph 51 of the Code explicitly permits them to delegate
that responsibility to investigators: "[t]he initial investigation shall be con-
ducted by examining magistrates or by investigators acting under the su-
pervision of examining magistrates. ' 59 In the latter situation, Rule 27 does
not apply-which means that investigators are free to question suspects in
the absence of counsel.
It is possible, of course, that Rule 27 was intended to apply to both
investigative judges and appointed investigators. That assumption, however,
is questionable; the architects of the IHT could hardly have been unaware of
the numerous provisions in the Code that specifically discuss the power of
investigators, as opposed to investigative judges. Moreover, even if Rule 27
was simply poorly drafted, the fact remains that the letter of the IHT Statute
permits uncounseled interrogations in situations where international due
process plainly forbids them.
2. The Right to Silence
The IHT's right-to-silence provisions also fall short of international
standards. Although Article 14 of the ICCPR does not specifically mention
a right to silence, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently
held that "there can be no doubt that the right to remain silent under police
questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recog-
nized international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair
procedure.,60 Moreover, as the European Court's generic use of the term
"police questioning" implies, the right to silence likely attaches even earlier
than the right to counsel, applying with equal force to questioning that takes
place before the suspect is arrested or detained. Both the ILC Draft Statute
and the ICC Statute explicitly state that the right to remain silent attaches as
61
soon as a person is suspected of a crime.
" Id., para. 51 (emphasis added).
6' Murray v. United Kingdom 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26, 60 (1996); see also Saunders v. United
Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 313, 329 (1996) (noting the same right).
6 See ILC Draft Statute, supra note 49, art. 26(6)(a) ("[a] person suspected of a crime
under this Statute shall... Prior to being questioned, be informed that the person is a suspect
and of the rights ... (i) To remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the
determination of guilt or innocence."); ICC Statute, supra note 49, art. 55(2) ("Where there
are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court and that person is about to be questioned either by the Prosecutor, or by national au-
thorities pursuant to a request made under Part 9, that person shall also have the following
rights of which he or she shall be informed prior to being questioned.... (b) To remain
silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or inno-
cence.").
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Like the right to counsel, the IHT guarantees the right to silence
only during questioning by an investigative judge, 62 after arrest,6 and at
trial.6 Those guarantees, however, do not satisfy international due process.
First, and most important, the right to silence does not extend to pre-arrest
interrogations that are conducted by anyone other than an investigative
judge-and as we have seen, an investigative judge normally does not get
involved in an investigation until the suspect is arrested.65
Second, although the IHT gives an arrested suspect the right not to
answer questions asked by either an investigator or an investigative judge,66
only investigative judges must inform the suspect of that right. 67 No such
obligation is imposed on investigators.6 ' That inconsistency, whether inten-
tional or unintentional, violates international due process, which explicitly
requires that suspects be informed of whatever rights they legally possess.69
62 See IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EvID. 27(First) ("A suspect who is questioned by an
Investigative Judge shall have the following rights of which he must be informed by the
Investigative Judge prior to questioning in a language he speaks and understands.. . (c) The
right to remain silent. In this regard, the suspect or accused must be cautioned that any state-
ment he makes may be used against him in court.").
63 See ICCP para. 126 (providing that, following arrest, "[t]he accused does not have to
answer any of the questions he is asked").
See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 19(4)(F) ("In directing any charge against the
accused pursuant to the present Law, the accused shall be entitled to a just fair trial in accor-
dance with the following minimum guarantees . . . [t]he defendant shall not be forced to
confess and shall have the right to remain silent and not provide any testimony and that silent
shall not be interpreted as evidence of convection or innocence.").
63 It is clear that, under the Rules, an investigative judge has the authority to be involved in
any stage of an investigation. See IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EVID. 23.
' This is done via incorporation of the ICCP. Paragraph 126 of the ICCP, which gives
arrested suspects the right to remain silent, is located in Section Five, "Questioning of the
accused." Paragraph 123 of Section Five specifically provides that "[t]he examining magis-
trate or investigator must question the accused within 24 hours of his attendance." (emphasis
added). See ICCP para. 123.
67 See IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EvID. 27(1) ("A suspect who is questioned by an
Investigative Judge shall have the following rights of which he must be informed by the In-
vestigative Judge prior to questioning .. ") (emphasis added).
Compare ICCP para. 126 with IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EVID. 27 (mentioning an
obligation to inform, in contrast to the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure).
See, e.g., Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of De-
tention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, Principle No. 13, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess.,
Supp. No. 49A, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9, 1988) ("Any person shall, at the moment of
arrest and at the commencement of detention or imprisonment, or promptly thereafter, be
provided by the authority responsible for his arrest, detention or imprisonment, respectively,
with information on and an explanation of his rights and how to avail himself of such
rights.").
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3. Record of Questioning
The IHT Rules provide that, when questioning a suspect, an inves-
tigative judge "may record that questioning by audio, video or via a court
reporter."70 Such recording is not required by international due process, even
though a permanent record of questioning is the most effective way to deter
interrogators from coercing suspects into confession," a practice that is spe-
cifically prohibited by Article 14 of the ICCPR." Nevertheless, the IHT
compares unfavorably with the ICTY and the ICC, both of which not only
require questioning to be either audio- or video-recorded-a court reporter
is insufficient-but also impose other procedures designed to minimize the
potential for coercion, such as requiring interruptions in questioning to be
noted on recordings themselves, giving the suspect the opportunity to clarify
his answers, and providing that at least one copy of the recorded interroga-
tion be sealed in the presence of the suspect.
7
4. The Powers of the Investigative Judge
Under the IHT's procedural law, the investigative judge is respon-
sible for all of the critical decisions involved in the pre-trial process. In par-
ticular, the investigative judge initiates investigations, 74 questions suspects,75
and decides whether suspects should be detained.76
From the standpoint of international due process, this concentration
of investigative functions is problematic. First, it is arguably inconsistent
with the suspect's absolute right77 under Article 14 of the ICCPR to an "im-
partial tribunal" 78-- one in which the judges do "not harbor preconceptions
70 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EviD. 28.
71 See Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 507, 526 (1994); see also SAFFERLING,
supra note 45, at 130.
72 See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3)(g) (guaranteeing a suspect the right "not to be
compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt").
71 See R. Proc. & Evid., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, R. 4,
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.20 (2001) [hereinafter ICTY Rules]; R. P & Evid. International Crimi-
nal Court, R. 112, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules].
74 See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 18(1) ("The Investigative Judge shall initiate
investigations ex-officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source, particularly
from the police, or governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The Investigative
Judge shall assess the information received and decide whether there is sufficient basis to
proceed.").
75 See id., art. 18(2) ("The Court Investigative Judge shall have the power to question
suspects ... ").
16 See IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EvID. 24(First)(A).
7 See Gonzdlez del Rio v. Peru, (263/1987), 28 October 1992, Report of the HRC, vol. II,
(A/48/40), 1993, at 20 ("the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal is an
absolute right").
" ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(1).
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about the matter before them."79 An investigative judge faced with the deci-
sion to detain a suspect he has personally investigated cannot be expected to
have no preconceptions about the correct choice; allowing the suspect to go
free would be tantamount to admitting that his investigation was inadequate.
The IHT's procedural law thus provides the investigative judge with a pow-
erful psychological incentive to justify his earlier investigation by ultimately
deciding to detainl At the very least, such a conflict of interest is incom-
patible with the appearance of impartiality, which Article 14 expressly for-
bids."
Second, because the same investigative judge investigates and de-
cides whether to detain, the IHT's standard for provisional detention is in-
adequate. The investigative judge is authorized to detain a suspect if he con-
cludes that there is a "reliable body of evidence that can be relied on and
which shows that the suspect may have committed a crime.'82 The ICC's
standard is far more stringent: the Pre-Trial Chamber can only issue a war-
rant of arrest if it is satisfied that there are "reasonable grounds to believe
that the person has committed a crime"-a standard equivalent to probable
cause. 1 The ICTY applies the same "may have committed" standard as the
IHT, but with a critical difference: investigations are conducted by the
Prosecutor, while decisions to detain are made by a Judge, thereby eliminat-
ing any possible conflict of interest."
Third, and finally, the fact that the investigative judge can both in-
terrogate and detain creates an unacceptable risk that he will use the threat
of detention to coerce a suspect into confessing. 6 Indeed, that danger is par-
ticularly acute given that-as we shall see-the investigative judge can pro-
visionally detain a suspect for up to ninety days without the possibility of
appellate review.
" Karttunen v. Finland, Communication No. 387/1989, 7.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989 (1992).
go See, e.g., David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects
of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 892, 893 (1993).
81 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 14(1); see also Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 169, 180 (1982) (discussing the impropriety of a former prosecutor presiding as judge
over a case in which he had a significant role in prosecuting).
82 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EVID. 24(Second)(A).
83 ICC Statute art. 58.
s See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining probable cause as "[a] reason-
able ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime").
" See ICTY R. 42bis ("The Judge shall order the transfer and provisional detention of the
suspect if the following conditions are met ... (ii) after hearing the Prosecutor, the Judge
considers that there is a reliable and consistent body of material which tends to show that the
suspect may have committed a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction.") (emphasis
added).
" See Salvatore ZappalA, The Iraqi Special Tribunal's Draft Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence: Neither Fish Nor Foul?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 855, 862 (2004).
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Admittedly, it is unclear whether any of these problems rise to the
level of an Article 14 violation; to date, no international court has addressed
the potential conflicts associated with a judge who both investigates and
decides whether to detain. That absence, however, likely reflects the fact
that IHT practice deviates substantially not only from international practice,
but from national practice, as well. 7 As Salvatore ZappalIA notes, "[m]ost
inquisitorial systems that originally provided for a similar power changed
their procedural rules precisely on this matter, and conferred the power [to
detain] on a different Judge . ,." France, for example, specifically
amended its Code of Penal Procedure in 2000 to require different judges to
investigate and detain.89
5. Review of Detention
According to Article 9(3) of the ICCPR:
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise ju-
dicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to re-
lease. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be de-
tained in custody."90
The IHT's rules regarding provisional detention violate Article 9.
Rule 25 authorizes the investigative judge to provisionally detain a suspect
for up to ninety days. 9' That decision is completely unreviewable: although
Rule 24 provides that "[t]he suspect must be released if ... [a] subsequent
order issued by the Investigative Judge or the Iraqi Special Tribunal dictates
as such,, 92 Rule 25 only permits the suspect to appeal a decision to extend
provisional detention beyond 90 or 180 days; he cannot appeal the initial
decision to detain itself
8' See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 117 (John Hatchard et al. eds, 1998)
(noting that, in Germany, the prosecution investigates while the pre-trial judge decides
whether to detain); EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 402 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R.
Spencer eds., 2004) (noting that, in Italy, the prosecutor who investigates must ask a judge to
order pre-trial detention).
88 ZappalA, supra note 86, at 862.
9 See JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF
THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE 71 (2005) (noting that the
amendment created ajuge des liberts et de la dtention because of the belief that "the inde-
pendence of the [luge d'instruction] was compromised by her investigative function in the
case.").
ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 9(3).
91 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EVID. 25(First)(1) ("Initially no accused may be subject to
a provisional detention period exceeding (90) days starting from the day following the sus-
pect placement in any detention unit of the Iraqi Special Tribunal.").
92 Id. at R. 24(Third).
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1. Initially no accused may be subject to a provisional detention period ex-
ceeding (90) days starting from the day following the suspect placement in
any detention unit of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. The period of detention
may be extended, by subsequent order by the Competent Judge, for an ad-
ditional (30) day period extendable for the same periods but may not ex-
ceed (180) days in total.
2. The extension for the period that to exceed (180) days shall be ordered
by the Competent Judge after receiving the consent of the President.
3. The decisions mentioned in paragraphs (first and second) above are ap-
pealable. 93
The IHT's "general rule," therefore, is that a suspect in pre-trial de-
tention will remain in custody for at least the 90-day duration of the investi-
gative judge's detention order. The suspect's only hope for relief is the pos-
sibility that the investigative judge will exercise his discretion and decide to
release him.94 Not only is that extremely unlikely, but it falls far short of
complying with the ICCPR's injunction that a detained suspect "be brought
promptly before a judge." Paragraph 111 of the Code, the relevant provision
governing release, does not require the investigative judge to reconsider his
decision at all, much less "promptly." 95 Moreover, the suspect does not have
any right to present an argument for release-a basic requirement for pre-
trial detention according to the European Court of Human Rights, if the
legality of detention is not reviewed by a different authority than the one
that makes the initial decision to detain.96
6. The Right to Prepare a Defense
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR provides that, "[i]n the determination of
any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following
minimum guarantees, in full equality .. .(b) To have adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with coun-
sel of his own choosing." 97
9' Id. at R. 25(First) (emphasis added).
94 ICCP para. 111 ("The judge who issued the decision to detain the accused may decide
to release him on a pledge, with or without bail, before the end of the period of detention...
9' See id.
96 See De Wilde, Ooms an Versyp v. Belgium, Judgment, 18 June 1971, Series A No. 12,
76 (holding that with regard to pre-trial detention, "an authority must provide the funda-
mental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty. If the procedure
of the competent authority does not provide them, the State could not be dispensed from
making available to the person concerned a second authority which does provide all the
guarantees of judicial procedure").
ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3)(b).
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Article 19 of the IHT Statute incorporates Article 14(3) nearly ver-
batim.98 Nevertheless, a number of provisions in the Tribunal's Rules of
Procedure undermine the effectiveness of the defendant's right to prepare a
defense.
a. Pre-Trial Disclosure
According to IHT Rule 40, the Prosecutor is only obligated to dis-
close witness statements and inculpatory evidence to the defense forty-five
days before trial.99 No provision in the Rules, Statute, or Code permits the
defense to seek disclosure at an earlier time. If the forty-five days proves
inadequate, the defense's only remedy is to ask the Tribunal for a continu-
ance, which it is under no obligation to grant."*
By imposing a fixed time limit on pre-trial disclosure, Rule 40 vio-
lates Article 14. In its General Commentary on subparagraph 3(b), the Hu-
man Rights Committee explicitly explains that what constitutes "adequate
time" must be determined "on the circumstances of each case."'' ° In prac-
tice, moreover, Rule 40 will nearly always cripple the defense:
Trying an individual for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes presents a special challenge to equality of arms. The re-
sources required to investigate and prosecute these crimes are very sub-
stantial, and often require the cooperation and assistance of foreign gov-
emments and intergovernmental organizations. The prosecution of such
cases-particularly command responsibility cases-may involve hundreds
of witnesses and thousands of exhibits for the prosecution .... 102
Saddam's trial is a case in point. The Dujail trial involved eight de-
fendants, nearly ten different charges, more than thirty-six prosecution wit-
nesses, and dozens of exhibits.1"3 The complexity of the Dujail trial, more-
over, pales in comparison to the complexity of the Anfal trial,'3 4 which Mi-
9 See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 19(Fourth)(B) ("In directing any charge
against the accused pursuant the present Law, the accused shall be entitled to a just fair trial
in accordance with the following minimum guarantees ... To have adequate time and facili-
ties for the preparation of his defense and to communicate freely with counsel of his own
choosing.").
99 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & Evil. R. 40(First).
'oo See id. at R. 34(Second) ("At the request of either party ... a Criminal court may issue
such orders ... as may be necessary for... the conduct of the trial.") (emphasis added).
'o' Human Rights Committee, 9, General Comment No. 13, , U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. l/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994) (hereinafter General Comment].
'02 Human Rights Watch, Former Iraqi Government, supra note 10, at 12.
'03 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, Show Trial or Real Trial? A Digest
of the Evidence Submitted During the Prosecution 's Case-in-Chief, in SADDAM ON TRIAL
188, 188-195 (MICHAEL P. SCHARF & GREGORY S. MCNEAL, 2006).
104 Largely due to the fact that the Anfal trial includes genocide charges, see Amit R. Paley,
"As Genocide Trial Begins, Hussein Is Again Defiant," WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2006), at
[Vol. 39:261
A POISONED CHALICE
chael Newton has described as "an ambitious undertaking that would stretch
the resources and capacity of almost any judicial body around the world."'' 5
Forty-five days to prepare such a case is wholly inadequate.
b. Extent of Disclosure
The Prosecutor's obligation to disclose the evidence it intends to
use at trial is also not absolute. On the contrary, when disclosure "may
prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reason may be
contrary to the public interest or affect the general security interests of any
State," a Judge sitting ex parte can permit the Prosecutor not to disclose that
evidence to the defense.1
By themselves, the non-disclosure provisions of Rule 40 do not vio-
late Article 14 of the ICCPR; international courts have consistently ap-
proved reasonable restrictions on a defendant's access to the Prosecutor's
files,' °7 and the ICTY's non-disclosure provision contains the same excep-
tions as Rule 4020' A critical problem arises, however, if the Prosecutor later
decides to use the undisclosed evidence: nothing in the Rules requires the
Prosecutor to disclose that evidence to the defense before he uses it at trial.
This lacuna cannot be dismissed as an oversight: unlike Rule 40, Rule 43
permits non-disclosure of confidential information that "has been used
solely for the purpose of generating new evidence,"' 9 but specifically re-
quires prior disclosure to the defense if "the Prosecutor elects to prevent as
evidence any testimony, document or other material so provided... ."0
Because it permits such sandbagging, Rule 40 blatantly violates the
defendant's right to "adequate .. .facilities for the preparation of his de-
fence." The essence of that right, according to the Human Rights Commit-
tee, is "access to documents and other evidence which the accused requires
to prepare his case. " ' Recognizing this, the ICC's non-disclosure provisions
prohibit the Prosecutor from using previously undisclosed evidence at trial
A10, which are particularly complex to defend. See, e.g., RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE
WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 143 (M. Cherif Bassiouni et al. eds., 2002)
(noting that, in the Krstic case before the ICTY128 witnesses were heard and 1098 Exhibits
were entered.").
'0' Michael A. Newton, The Significance of the Anfal Campaign Indictment, in SADDAM ON
TRIAL 220,220 (MICHAEL P. SCHARF & GREGORY S. MCNEAL, 2006).
" IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EViD. 43 R. 40(Second).
107 See X v. Austria (7138/75), 5 July 1977, 9 DR 50.
... See ICTY R. 66(C). It is worth noting that the ICC permits non-disclosure only for
reasons of confidentiality, see ICC R. 81(3), and national security, see ICC Statute art. 72.
o9 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EVID. 43.
"o Id. at R. 43(Third).
II General Comment, supra note 101, para. 9.
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"without adequate prior disclosure to the accused."" 2 The ICC's approach is
sound: it is impossible for a defendant to defend himself against evidence
that he doesn't know exists."3
c. Exculpatory Evidence
Although a defendant does not have the right to all of the evidence
in the Prosecutor's file, he does have a right to any evidence that would tend
to exculpate him." 4 As the European Court of Human Rights has noted, if
the defendant is not made aware of exculpatory evidence, he cannot "pre-
sent his case in conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
his opponent," in violation of the principle of equality that is central to a fair
trial." 5
The HT, however, does not require the Prosecutor to disclose all
exculpatory evidence to the defense. Although Rule 42 seems to impose an
unqualified disclosure obligation on the Prosecutor,"6 Rule 43 specifically
exempts all exculpatory information provided to the Prosecutor in confi-
dence:
If the [Prosecutor] is in possession of information which was provided to
it, on a confidential basis and which has been used solely for the purpose
of generating new evidence, that initial information and its origin-
notwithstanding Rule 42-shall not be disclosed by the [Prosecutor] with-
out the consent of the person or entity providing the initial information."'
112 See ICC R. 81 (information relevant to ongoing investigations) & R. 82 (confidential
information).
"' That evidence, moreover, will likely be critical to the Prosecutor's case; the Prosecutor
would not lightly decide to use evidence sensitive enough to qualify for non-disclosure under
R. 40. Much of the surprise evidence introduced at the Dujail trial was extremely damning.
See Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail, supra note 5, at 49 (noting the Prosecution's
tendency "to engage in 'trial by ambush,' in which incriminating documents were not dis-
closed to the defense until the day that the document was used in court.").
"' See ZappalA, supra note 86, at 864 (noting that the obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence is a "perplexing" one," citing Rule 76).
1" See Foucher v. France, 22209/93 [1997], ECHR 234, para. 34. This is especially true
given that the exculpatory evidence will normally be in the Prosecutor's hands. See
SAFFERLING, supra note 45, at 202 (noting that "[t]he investigating authorities are ...
equipped with investigative powers and are abetted by the whole state machinery. Their
access to information and their methods of obtaining evidence are incomparably better than
those on the defence side.").
116 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EvID. R. 42(Second) ("[Tihe Prosecutor shall disclose to
the defence lawyer the existence of evidence known to the Prosecutor which in any way tend
to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or may affect the credibility of a
prosecution witness or the authenticity of prosecution evidence. The Prosecutor shall disclose
the grounds of the penalties continuously.").
"' Id. at R. 43(Second) (emphasis added). The paragraph uses the word "tribunal" instead
of "Prosecutor," but the next paragraph makes clear that the rule is addressed to the Prosecu-
tor. See id., R. 43(Third) ("If, after obtaining the written consent of the person or entity pro-
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Rule 43, in other words, specifically provides that the Prosecutor's
obligation to protect confidential information trumps his obligation to dis-
close exculpatory evidence, as indicated by its "notwithstanding Rule 42"
language.
Rule 43 is troubling, given that Rule 40 specifically permits a des-
ignated judge to order non-disclosure of information relevant to an ongoing
investigation, national-security information, and information whose disclo-
sure would be otherwise inimical to the public interest."8 The first two cate-
gories of information will almost always satisfy the requirements of Rule
43: by definition, investigative information and national-security informa-
tion are normally provided in confidence by a person or government entity.
And it is reasonable to assume that any information in the amorphous third
category will also normally be provided in confidence; how could the re-
lease of non-confidential information harm the public interest?
Rule 43, in short, significantly curtails the defendant's right to pre-
sent a defense. Protecting confidential sources is important, but the need for
secrecy cannot justify turning a blind eye to the conviction of an innocent
defendant.'9
7. Confirmation of Indictment
As we have seen, the fact that the investigative judge is responsible
for initiating investigations, questioning suspects, and ordering suspects
provisionally detained is arguably inconsistent with a defendant's right un-
der Article 14(1) of the ICCPR to an "impartial tribunal." The investigative
judge's powers, it is important to note, do not stop there: at the conclusion
of the investigation, the investigative judge is also responsible for deciding
whether a prima facie case exists against the defendant. If he concludes that
it does, he then "prepare[s] an indictment containing a concise statement of
the facts of the crime ... and refer[s] the case to the criminal court."' 20
There is, of course, nothing unusual about a criminal-justice system
that entrusts the power to investigate and the power to indict to the same
government entity. 2' The IHT is unusual, however, in one critical respect:
viding information under this Sub-rule (Second), the Prosecutor elects to present as evidence
any testimony, document, or other material so provided .. ") (emphasis added).
.. Id. at R. 40(Second).
"' See Salvatore ZappalA, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Materials and
the Recent Amendment to R. 68 ICTYRPE, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 620, 626 (2004). The ICC,
it is worth noting, better resolves the conflict between secrecy and fairness. When the defen-
dant seeks to discover national-security information that the Court deems relevant and neces-
sary to his defense, the Court retains the option to draw an inference "as to the existence or
non-existence of a fact" instead of requiring disclosure. See ICC Statute, art. 72(7).
20 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 18(Third).
121 See SAFFERLING, supra note 45, at 174-78 (discussing the Anglo-American tradition
and international practice).
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the IHT Statute does not require the Tribunal to review the sufficiency of the
indictment prior to trial. The relevant provision is Article 20:
First: A person against whom an indictment has been issued shall, pursu-
ant to an order or an arrest warrant of the investigative judge, be taken into
custody, immediately informed of the charges against him and transferred
to the Court.
Second: The Criminal Court shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious
and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with this Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence annexed to this Law, with full respect for
the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of the victims,
their relatives and the witnesses.
Third: The Criminal Court shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that the
rights of the accused are respected and guaranteed, insure that the accused
understands the indictment, with charges directed against him and instruct
the accused to enter a plea.
Nothing in Article 20 requires-or even permits-the Tribunal to
review prior to trial the investigative judge's conclusion that there is a prima
facie case against the defendant. On the contrary, the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure specifically delays confirmation of the indictment until after the
prosecution's case-in-chief Paragraph 167 of the Code says that the initial
stage of the trial consists of identifying the defendant, hearing the testimony
of the complaining witness, and examining the prosecution's evidence.
Paragraph 181 then provides, in relevant part:
If it appears to the court, after the aforementioned steps have been taken,
that the evidence indicates that the defendant has committed the offence
being considered, then he is charged as appropriate, the charge is read to
him and clarified and he is asked to enter a plea.
M
Article 20 deviates substantially from the international tribunals, all
of which require a Prosecutor's decision to indict a defendant be reviewed
by an independent judicial body.1 24 It also differs from the December 10,
2003 version of the IHT Statute, which specifically required the chief inves-
tigative judge to review the sufficiency of the indictment.2 5 Either method is
1 ICCP para. 167.
23 Id. para. 18 1(c) (emphasis added).
124 See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 25, art. 19(1) ("The judge of the Trial Chamber to
whom the indictment has been transmitted shall review it. If satisfied that a prima facie case
has been established by the Prosecutor, he shall confirm the indictment. If not so satisfied,
the indictment shall be dismissed.") (emphasis added); ICC Statute, supra note 49, art. 61
("[T]he Pre-Trial Chamber shall hold a hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prose-
cutor intends to seek trial. The hearing shall be held in the presence of the Prosecutor and the
person charged, as well as his or her counsel.") (emphasis added).
.2 See Statute of the Iraqi High Triunal, art. 19(a) ("If the Chief Tribunal Investigative
Judge is satisfied that a prima facie case has been established by the Tribunal Investigative
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clearly superior: because the IHT no longer requires pre-trial judicial review
of the investigative judge's decision to indict, the investigative judge is able
to control every stage of the pre-trial process, from initiating the investiga-
tion to deciding whether the defendant will go to trial. That concentration of
power is fundamentally inconsistent with Article 14(l)'s guarantee of an
"impartial tribunal."
The IHT's practice of not confirming the indictment until after the
prosecution's case-in-chief also undermines the defendant's interrelated
Article 14 rights "[t]o be informed promptly ... of the nature and cause of
the charge against him"'126 and "[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence."'27 Regarding the former, the Human Rights
Committee has clearly stated that the defendant's right to be informed of the
charges "arise[s] when in the course of an investigation a court or an author-
ity of the prosecution decides to take procedural steps against a person sus-
pected of a crime or publicly names him as such."'28 In theory, the IHT hon-
ors that requirement: Article 20 not only requires the investigative judge to
inform a defendant of the charges against him once he is taken into cus-
tody,'29 it also requires the Tribunal to read the indictment prepared by the
investigative judge to the defendant once he is transferred to a detention
facility.'" As Paragraph 181 indicates, however, those charges are only pro-
visional: not only does the Tribunal remain free to consider different or ad-
ditional charges that appear to be supported by the evidence presented dur-
ing the prosecution's case-in-chief, it is under no obligation to inform the
defendant of the different and/or new charges until the prosecution's case-
in-chief is complete. Indeed, as noted earlier, that is exactly what happened
in the Dujail trial. 3' Paragraph 181 thus reduces Article 20's guarantee of
the defendant's right to be informed of the charges against him to a virtual
nullity.
Finally, the IHT's sanction of mid-trial confirmation is inconsistent
with the defendant's right "[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence." It is obvious that a defendant cannot prepare an
adequate defense if the charges against him can change in the middle of a
trial, after his counsel has cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses. Yet
Judge, then he/she shall confirm the indictment. If not so satisfied, the indictment shall be
dismissed without prejudice.").
12 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3)(a).
,27 Id. art. 14(3)(b).
'2' General Comment, supra note 101, 8.
' Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 20(First).
3 ld. art. 20(Third).
The charging document read by the Tribunal on May 15, 2006 added at least one new
charge against seven of the defendants, including enforced disappearance, and "other inhu-
mane acts" deliberately causing severe suffering. See Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail,
supra note 5, at 43.
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that is precisely what Paragraph 181's mid-trial confirmation of the indict-
ment allows.
B. Trial
1. Trials in Absentia
Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR provides that "[i]n the determination
of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled ... [t]o be
tried in his presence."'32 Despite the seemingly categorical nature of that
right, the Human Rights Committee has said that trials in absentia may be
held "exceptionally for justified reasons."'33 It is unclear what reasons are
sufficient; the international criminal tribunals permit a trial to proceed in
absentia only when a defendant has been repeatedly disruptive.13
Consistent with traditional Iraqi criminal procedure, the IHT per-
mits trials in absentia. Once the Tribunal has received the defendant's case
file from the investigative judge, it sets a date for trial and notifies the de-
fendant of that date.' 35 If the defendant absconds, the Tribunal instructs the
police "to pin an arrest warrant at his home, publish the warrant in two local
newspapers, and announce the warrant on radio or television.' ' 36 The Tribu-
nal then sets a new trial date that is no later than two months from the date
the warrant is published.' At the end of that two-month period, unless the
defendant has filed a written excuse for why he will not attend the trial, "a
trial will take place in his absence"'38 according to normal trial procedures. 3 9
If the defendant is found guilty and does not appear within six months, the
judgment will become final and have the same status as a judgment "in the
132 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3)(d).
133 General Comment, supra note 101, para. 11. The UN Secretary General, it is worth
noting, disagrees. See also SAFFERLING, supra note 45, at 243 (noting that the Secretary
General has stated "in clear terms that no trial should be held in the absence of the defen-
dant," because "he believes that such trials would be against Art. 14 ICCPR").
IM See, e.g., ICC Statute art. 20(a) (permitting trial in the absence of the defendant "[i]f the
accused, being present before the Court, continues to disrupt the trial"). The ICTY permits
the so-called "R. 61 procedure" whenever "within a reasonable time, a warrant of arrest has
not been executed." ICTY R. 61(A). That procedure, however, is not a trial in absentia, be-
cause R. 61 does not permit the Trial Chamber to find the absent defendant guilty. See
SAFFERLING, supra note 45, at 244.
... ICCP para. 143(A).
13' Id. para. 143(C).
137 Id.
... Id. para. 147(A) ("If the accused has absconded or is absent without legal excuse, de-
spite his having been informed, a trial will take place in his absence.").
,' Id. para. 149(A).
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presence of the parties. 40 The maximum penalty, however, will be life im-
prisonment; the death penalty is not permitted for a conviction in absentia. 14
If Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR permits trials in absentia only
when the defendant disrupts or refuses to attend a court session, the IHT's
provisions are unacceptably permissive. The Code only prohibits a trial in
absentia when the defendant is able to present the Tribunal with an "accept-
able" excuse for absence-an assessment that is left to the Tribunal's sole
discretion.
It is possible, of course, that Article 14(3)(d) permits trials in absen-
tia in a wider range of circumstances. 42 But even if it does, the IHT's proce-
dural regime still violates international due process. According to the Hu-
man Rights Committee, "strict observance of the rights of the defence is all
the more necessary" when a trial is held in the absence of the defendant.
4
1
In particular, the burden of proof must be on the Prosecutor to prove that the
defendant did not appear because he was trying to evade justice,'" and the
defendant must be entitled to a new trial once he is located.1
45
The Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide a defendant with
either of these procedural protections. First, according to Paragraph 146, the
defendant is responsible for establishing cause for his absence; if he wants
an extension of the trial date, he must "present a written excuse" to the Tri-
'" See id. para. 243 (providing that, after six months without an objection, "the verdict of
guilty and the principal and subsidiary penalties will have the status of a judgement in the
presence of the parties").
"' Id. para. 248(1). Paragraph 248(1), it is important to note, conflicts with Paragraph 245
and Paragraph 247, both of which contemplate a defendant sentenced to death in absentia.
See id. para. 245(D) (noting, with regard to the general time-limit for objecting to a convic-
tion in absentia, that "[t]he exception to paragraphs A and B is in the case of the death sen-
tence or a sentence to life imprisonment"), para. 247(A) ("When a person is arrested and
sentenced in absentia to death or to a prison sentence..."). There is no obvious way to rec-
oncile the different provisions, other than to suggest that the Code allows the defendant to be
sentenced to death in absentia but not actually executed if he is located. That distinction
makes some sense-it preserves the symbolism of a death sentence for a defendant who is
never expected to be found while avoiding the unfairness that would inhere in carrying out
such a sentence.
142 See, e.g., ARCHBOLD, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND
EVIDENCE 350 (Karim A. A. Khan et al. ed. 2005) (2005) (noting that, notwithstanding the
clear language of R. 80(B), the ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that illness can also justify
a court proceeding in absentia).
14' General Comment, supra note 10 1, para. 11.
'44 Colozza v Italy, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 30 (1985) ("[A] person 'charged with
a criminal offence'. . . must not be left with the burden of proving that he was not seeking to
evade justice or that his absence was due to force majeure.").
141 Id. para. 29 ("When domestic law permits a trial to be held notwithstanding the absence
of a person 'charged with a criminal offence'... that person should, once he becomes aware
of the proceedings, be able to obtain, from a court which has heard him, a fresh determina-
tion of the merits of the charge.").
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bunal-and even then the Tribunal is under no obligation to accept the ex-
146
cuse.
Second, although the issue is murkier, the Code does not appear to
require that the defendant be re-tried once he is located. Paragraph 245 pro-
vides that once the convicted defendant re-appears, the Tribunal will "exam-
ine the case again in the light of the objection and will issue its judgement
with the support of the judgement in absentia or will amend it or cancel it,
on condition that it will be not judged more harshly than the sentence im-
posed in absentia.' ' 47 Such appellate review, however, is not sufficient.
14
1
If Paragraph 245 was the only provision in the Code governing
convictions in absentia, the IHT's procedures would clearly violate Article
14(3)(d) of the ICCPR. Paragraph 247, though, confuses the issue; unlike
Paragraph 245, it provides that when a defendant who is sentenced in absen-
tia to "death or a prison sentence" re-appears, "his trial will resume and the
court has the right to issue any judgement permitted under th, law. Its deci-
sion will be subject to appeal by any other legal means. ,1 49 The expression
"trial will resume" could conceivably be interpreted to mean that the defen-
dant must be given a new trial.
That interpretation of Paragraph 247, however, is ultimately unper-
suasive. To begin with, the Paragraph does not specifically require a new
trial; it provides only that the trial shall "resume." Given that Paragraph 247
only applies once a defendant has been convicted, resuming the trial could
not involve more than the re-examination of the conviction required by
Paragraph 245. Moreover, even if we read the two paragraphs as applying to
different kinds of defendants-Paragraph 245 to defendants who object to
their convictions within six months; Paragraph 247 to defendants who do
not -- interpreting Paragraph 247 to require a new trial is illogical, because
that would mean defendants who do not object to their convictions on time
are entitled to a new trial, while defendants who do object are entitled only
to appellate review.
146 ICCP para. 146 ("The defendant may present a written excuse if he does not attend, and
his me [sic] of his relatives may present this report. If it is accepted by the court, another time
is fixed for the trial, and the defendant and others connected with the case are given notifica-
tion.").
147 Id. para. 245(C).
148 See Colozza, para. 30; see also SAFFERLING, supra note 45, at 243 (noting that "the
entire trial has to be repeated fiom the beginning.").
149 ICCP para. 247(A).
150 Paragraph 247 does not mention the six-month window to object to the conviction,
whereas Paragraph 245(C) applies only "if the objector attends and the objection is submitted
within its legal time-limit." ICCP paras. 247, 245(c). This conclusion is suspect, however,
because Paragraph 245(D) waives the provisions of subparagraph (A) and (B) if a defendant
has been sentenced to death or life imprisonment, implying that such defendants must be
treated as if they had objected to their convictions within the time-limit. Id. para. 245(D).
[Vol. 39:261
A POISONED CHALICE
The most persuasive interpretation of Paragraphs 245 and 247,
therefore, is that they require the same kind of judicial review for a defen-
dant convicted in absentia. Paragraph 245 specifically requires appellate
review, not a new trial, and Paragraph 247 is consistent with such review,
even if it could be interpreted to require more. As a result, although the mat-
ter cannot be resolved definitively, it seems likely that defendants convicted
in absentia are never entitled to a new trial-a specific violation of Article
14(3)(d) of the ICCPR.
2. Cross-Examination of Witnesses
Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR provides that "[i]n the determination
of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled ... to exam-
ine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the atten-
dance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same condi-
tions as witnesses against him." '' Subparagraph (e) does not require all wit-
ness statements to be made in open court; a statement obtained during the
pre-trial investigation can be used at trial, as long as the defendant was af-
forded an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at some stage of the
proceedings. In the absence of that opportunity, however, admitting the wit-
ness's statements not only violates the defendant's right of confrontation, it
deprives him of a fair trial.' 5
Despite Article 14(3)(e), the IHT allows statements by witnesses
whom the defendant never had an opportunity to cross-examine to be used
at trial. Paragraph 213(a) of the Code permits the Tribunal to base its verdict
on the evidence "presented during any stage of the inquiry"' 53-which
means, as Human Rights Watch has pointed out, that "everything contained
in the dossier constitutes evidence, and the trial court is entitled to treat all
witness testimony in the investigative dossier as having been given at
trial.' 54 If the defendant had the right to question the investigative judge's
witnesses during the investigation, paragraph 213(a) would not violate his
confrontation rights. But that is not the case. First, although Paragraph 57 of
the Code gives a defendant and his counsel a general right to attend the pre-
trial investigation, the investigative judge has the discretion to override that
151 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3)(e).
1 See Delta v. France, 191 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1990).
"51 ICCP para. 213(A).
"' Human Rights Watch, The Former Iraqi Government On Trial, supra note 10, at 5.
Although Paragraph 212 of the Code prohibits the Tribunal from basing its verdict on evi-
dence that "has not been brought up for discussion or referred to during the hearing," ICCP
para. 212, the Tribunal reads "the reports, investigations and other documents" into the re-
cord at the beginning of trial. See id. para. 167. During the Dujail trial, the IHT read the
statements of twenty-three prosecution witnesses the defense had never been able to question
into the record. See Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail, supra note 5, at 49.
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right "if the matter in hand so requires" ' -a standard so vague that it de-
fies definition.
Second, even when a defendant and his counsel are permitted to at-
tend the investigation, they have no right to cross-examine witnesses. Para-
graph 57 is explicit in that regard: "they shall not have the right to speak
unless permitted to do so. ,156 Moreover, although Paragraph 63 permits the
defendant and his counsel to "make observations on evidence given and...
ask for a witness to be questioned again, or for other witnesses to be ques-
tioned about other facts to which they refer," the investigative judge can
deny any such request on the ground that it would be "impracticable or
would delay the investigation unjustifiably or would pervert the course of
justice ,117-another discretionless standard.
Third, and finally, the IHT Rules do not cure the problems with the
Code. As part of the investigative judge's obligation to collect exculpatory
as well as inculpatory evidence, Rule 23 permits the defendant to "request
an Investigative Judge to conduct any relevant and material witness inter-
views.' The Rule, however, does not require the investigative judge or the
Tribunal to grant such requests' 59 -and in any case, an interview conducted
by an investigative judge cannot satisfy the defendant's right of confronta-
tion, particularly given the limitations discussed above.
3. Self-Representation
Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR gives defendants the right to repre-
sent themselves at trial. 60 All of the intemational tribunals recognize that
right,' 6' and the Human Rights Committee has specifically held that a do-
mestic statute that does not guarantee self-representation violates Article
14.162
... ICCP para. 57(A) ("An accused person, a plaintiff, a civil plaintiff, a person responsible
in civil law for the actions of the accused and their representatives may attend the investiga-
tion while it is in progress. The magistrate or the investigator may prohibit their attending if
the matter in hand so requires, for reasons that he shall enter in the record, with the proviso
that they shall be granted access to the investigation as soon as the need to prohibit their
attendance ceases.").
156 id.
,' Id. para. 63(B).
.S8 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EvID. 23(Third).
"' Id. at R. 34.
160 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3)(d) ("In the determination of any criminal charge
against him, everyone shall be entitled.., to defend himself in person.").
161 See, e.g., ICTY Statute art. 21(4)(d); ICC Statute art. 67.
162 See Michael and Brian Hill v. Spain, Communication No. 526/1993, para. 14.2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993 (April 2, 1997), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/
undocs/html/VWS526.htm.
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Early versions of the IHT Statute guaranteed the right of self-
representation. Article 20 of the December 10, 2003 version, for example,
provided that a defendant had the right "to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing."'63 The current Statute, how-
ever, removed that language-and the right of self-representation along
with it.' 6"
Given Slobodan Milogevid's antics during his trial at the ICTY,' 65 it
is understandable that the IHT did not want to allow Saddam to represent
himself at the Dujail trial. Categorically depriving all defendants of the right
to self-representation, however, is an overbroad remedy that violates the
ICCPR.
4. Qualifications of Appointed Defense Attorneys
In addition to protecting the right of self-representation, Article
14(3)(d) of the ICCPR provides that, "[i]n the determination of any criminal
charge against him, everyone shall be entitled ... to have legal assistance
assigned to him.., in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to
pay for it.'" 6 That right, according to the European Court of Human Rights,
imposes an affirmative obligation on a government to provide an indigent
defendant with an effective attorney, 67 one that possesses the "experience
and competence commensurate with the nature of the offence assigned" to
him. 61 In other words, the more serious the charges against the defendant,
the more experienced and knowledgeable the appointed attorney must be.
The IHT Statute guarantees all indigent defendants the right to
counsel.'69 The Rules, however, only require the Defence Office to appoint
attorneys who are "highly qualified"' 7 -- a vague standard that contrasts
unfavorably with those imposed by the international tribunals. The ICTY,
for example, requires appointed attorneys to possess "established compe-
tence in criminal law and/or international criminal law/international hu-
manitarian law/international human rights law" and have "at least seven
years of relevant experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor, attorney or in
some other capacity, in criminal proceedings."'' Similarly, the ICC requires
appointed attorneys to have "established competence in international or
163 See Statute of the Iraqi Tribunal, art. 20(d)(4).
164 See id. art. 19(Fourth)(D) (providing only that the defendant has the right "to use a
lawyer of his own choosing").
165 See, e.g., Debra J. Saunders, No Order in the Court, S.F. CHRON. July 30, 2002, at AI7.
'6 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3)(d).
,67 Artico v. Italy, 3 EUR. CT.H.R. 1, 15 (1980).
'6' Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra note 48, no. 6.
169 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 19(Fourth)(D).
'70 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EVID. 30(Fourth).
1 ICTY R. 44(B).
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criminal law and procedure, as well as the necessary relevant experience,
whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in
criminal proceedings.' 72
5. Protection of Defense Attorneys
An integral part of the right to counsel is the right to insist that the
government protect defense attorneys from physical harm. The U.N. Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers specifically provide that "[w]here the
security of lawyers is threatened as a result of discharging their functions,
they shall be adequately safeguarded by the authorities."''
Given that three defense attorneys were murdered during the Dujail
trial,' 74 it is obvious that the IHT has failed to adequately safeguard the "se-
curity of lawyers." Whether the murdered defense attorneys unreasonably
rejected efforts by the IHT and Iraqi government to protect them is open to
dispute. 7 15 What is not debatable, however, is that although the Statute and
Rules require the IHT to ensure the safety of victims and witnesses, they
neither require the Tribunal to protect the safety of defense attorneys 16 nor
177provide the defense with a formal mechanism to request that it do so.
C. Judgment and Sentence
1. Burden of Proof
Although the IHT Statute provides that all defendants must be pre-
sumed innocent,7 1 it does not specify the burden of proof necessary to con-
vict. Paragraph 213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, specifi-
cally permits conviction "based on the extent to which it is satisfied by the
evidence presented during any stage of the inquiry or the hearing.'
79
72 ICC R. 22.
,73 Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra note 48, no. 18.
'7, See Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail, supra note 5, at 21.
175 See generally id., at 20-24.
176 Cf Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 21 ("The Criminal Court shall, in its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence annexed to this Statue, provide the protection for victims or their
relatives and witnesses and also for the secrecy of their identity.").
,77 Cf IRAQI HIGH TRIB NAL R. P. & EviD. 48(First) ("A Chamber may, on its own initia-
tive, or at the request of either party, the victim or witness concerned, or the Victims and
Witnesses Unit, order appropriate measures to safeguard the privacy and security of a victim
or a witness, provided that those measures are consistent with the rights of the accused. A
Chamber may order measures to protect a victim or witness before any indictment is con-
firmed or at any other time.").
... See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 19(2).
" ICCP para. 213(A) (emphasis added).
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Paragraph 213(a)'s "satisfaction" standard' s violates international
due process. The Human Rights Committee has explicitly stated in its
commentary on Article 14(2) of the ICCPR that "[n]o guilt can be presumed
until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt,"'' and every
international tribunal since the Nuremberg Military Tribunals'82 has em-
ployed a reasonable-doubt standard. 3
At least one scholar has argued that the IHT's "satisfaction" stan-
dard is "the traditional standard which civil law judicial systems (like
France and Holland) employ, and a phrase that.., is functionally equivalent
to the American 'beyond reasonable doubt standard.""' That is incorrect.
The Netherlands uses a "gained the conviction" standard that is higher than
the IHT's "satisfied" standard, even if it does not actually require proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. France uses an "intimate conviction" standard
1 85
that, according to the European Court of Human Rights, is functionally
equivalent to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.86 And most civil-law coun-
tries-including Germany,'87 Spain,'88 and Russial-explicitly employ the
"reasonable doubt" standard. By any civil law standard, therefore, the IHT's
"satisfaction" standard is inadequate.
,80 A representative of Human Rights Watch has suggested in a private conversation with
the author that it is possible "convinced" is a better translation of paragraph 213 than "satis-
fied." If that is correct-and no official IHT source has claimed that it is-the Dutch stan-
dard cited below is arguably similar. Even so, the standard still differs from the standards
used by other civil-law countries, most (if not all) of which use a reasonable-doubt standard
or its equivalent.
181 General Comment, supra note 101, 7.
82 See, e.g., United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., XIV, TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW. No. 10,
314 (1950) ("Ministries Case") (noting that "the Tribunal has undeviatingly adhered to the
proposition that a defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
83 See, e.g., ICC Statute art. 66(3); ICTY R. 87(A); Special Court for Sierra Leone, R. of
Proc. & Evid., at R. 87(a) (March 7, 2003) (amended May 29, 2004).
18 Michael P. Scharf, Did the Dujail Trial Meet International Standards of Due Process?
in SADDAM ON TRIAL 162, 164 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal, 2006).
185 C. PR. PEN. § 353 available at http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdfcode 34.pdf. ("The law asks
only one question which sums up your entire duty. Do you have an intimate conviction?").
Italy uses a similar "definitive conviction" standard. See Thomas V. Mulrine, Note, Reason-
able Doubt: How in the WorldIs It Defined?, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 195,221 (1997).
'" See Barberd, Messegud and Jabardo v Spain, 11 E.H.R.R. 360, para. 77 (1988).
.87 See, e.g., Decision of November 6, 1998 (German Supreme Court), 19 StV, at 5-7 (not-
ing that, to convict, "a measure of confidence suffices which is sufficient according to life
experience and excludes only reasonable doubt").
188 Stephen C. Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 241, 354 (1998) (noting that Spain uses a reasonable-doubt standard).
9 Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial By Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INTL. L.
61, 124 (1995) (noting that Russia uses a reasonable-doubt standard).
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2. Sentencing Discretion
A critical aspect of the principle of legality is the idea that criminal
penalties must be established by law-nullum poena sine lege.'90 The nul-
lum poena principle is enshrined in Article 15 of the ICCPR'9' and in Article
19 of the Iraqi Constitution, which provides that "there is no crime or pun-
ishment except by a stipulation." '192
As Bassiouni has pointed out, Article 24 of the IHT Statute violates
the nullum poena principle.9 The Article provides, in relevant part:
Third: The penalty for crimes under Articles 11, 12, 13 shall be deter-
mined by the Criminal Court, taking into account the provisions contained
in paragraphs fourth and fifth...
Fifth: The penalty for any crimes under Articles 11, 12, 13 which do not
have a counterpart under Iraqi law shall be determined by the Court taking
into account such factors like the gravity of the crime, the individual cir-
cumstances of the convicted person, guided by judicial precedents and
relevant sentences issued by the international criminal courts.
194
There is most likely no nullum poena problem for those war crimes
and crimes against humanity that have "a counterpart under Iraqi law," such
as unlawful detention, torture, and rape195; the structure of Article 24 implies
that the sentences for those crimes should be determined by reference to
their domestic counterparts, which do impose specific penalties. 96 The IHT
Statute does not, however, stipulate the penalties for any of the other war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide; determining the appropriate
sentence is left to the discretion of the judges, guided only by-note the
non-mandatory language-judicial precedents and international sentences.
'90 See Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 373.
191 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 15(1).
192 [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iraq], art. 19(Second) [2005]. Full text of
English translation by the U.N. Office of Constitutional Support approved by the Iraqi gov-
ernment is available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
'9' See Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 378 ("The delegation of legislative power by the IST to
the judges to determine penalties for crimes under Articles 11 through 13 of the Statute ex-
pressly conflicts with the principle that there can be no penalty without an expressed provi-
sion in'the law.").
194 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 24.
195 See Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 376-77 (listing the crimes contained in Articles 11, 12,
and 13 that have domestic counterparts).
1 See, e.g., [Penal Law No. Ill of 1969] STS 251/88, para. 421 (Iraq) (establishing penal-
ties for unlawful deprivation of liberty) unofficial English translation available at
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IraqiPenalCode_1969.pdf.
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Such discretion, according to the Human Rights Committee, specifically
violates the nullum poena principle.9 7
3. Scope of the Death Penalty
The IHT's discretion to determine the sentence of any crime under
Article 11, 12, of 13 also runs afoul of the ICCPR's restrictions on the use
of the death penalty. Although the ICCPR does not categorically prohibit
capital punishment,'98 it does provide that a "sentence of death may be im-
posed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force
at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provi-
sions of the present Covenant."'" The category of "most serious crimes" is a
narrow one, limited to "intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely
grave consequences." 2
Article 24 of the IHT Statute specifically authorizes the Tribunal to
impose any of the penalties prescribed by the Iraqi Penal Code,"' including
death.2°2 That authority extends to all of the crimes contained in Article 11,
12, or 13.203 Many of those crimes, however, clearly do not involve the le-
thal or otherwise grave consequences that would qualify them as "the most
serious"-forcible pregnancy," imprisonment in violation of the norms of
international law,205 denying a protected person a fair trial,206 attacking civil-
ian objects,207 pillaging,2 0 and so on.
4. Death Penalty for International Crimes
Although the argument is more speculative, it is worth noting that
the HIT may violate international due process by permitting the death pen-
alty at all. According to Article 6 of the ICCPR, death-eligible crimes must
have been punishable by death "in accordance with the law in force at the
" See Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Democratic Peoples' Repub-
lic of Kampuchea, CCPR/CO/72/PRK (2001), 14.
0' See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 6.
'9 Id. art. 6(2).
200 Human Rights and the Administration of Justice, G.A. Res. 39/118, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.A/39/700 (1984).
201 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art 24(First).
202 [Penal Law No. 111 of 1969] STS 251/88, para. 25(1) (Iraq) (establishing penalties for
unlawful deprivation of liberty) unofficial English translation available at http://law.case.
edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi PenalCode_1969.pdf.
203 See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 24(Third).
204 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art.12(First)(G).
Id. art. 12(First)(E).
206 Id. art. 13(First)(F).
20 Id. art. 13(Second)(B).
m Id. art. 13(Second)(Q).
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
time of the[ir] commission. ''209 In other words, if a crime did not carry the
death penalty when it was committed, a national court cannot sentence a
defendant to death because a subsequent change in the law made the crime
death eligible-a limitation that reflects the ICCPR's general prohibition on
210retroactive sentencing increases.
The problem is that, strictu sensu, Iraqi criminal law did not crimi-
nalize war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide prior to the crea-
tion of the IHT,21 much less punish them with death. That is why Article 24
refers to "crimes under Articles 11, 12, 13 which do not have a counterpart
under Iraqi law"22 and Article 14 gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over any
domestic Iraqi crime if it "finds a default in the elements of any of the
crimes stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13. ''2l3 As a result, because the IHT
Statute was enacted subsequent to the Tribunal's temporal jurisdiction, no
war crime, crime against humanity, or act of genocide could ever have car-
ried the death penalty in Iraq under the "law in force at the time of its com-
mission." Imposing the death penalty for those crimes would thus seem to
violate Article 6 of the ICCPR.
This argument, of course, depends upon reading the expression
"law in force" to refer only to the national law in force at the time the crime
was committed. If the expression refers to both national law and interna-
tional law-along the lines of Article 15 of the ICCPR2' 4-the retroactivity
problem disappears, because international law clearly allowed the death
penalty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide prior to July
17, 1968, the earliest date of the IHT's jurisdiction over those crimes."' It is
unclear which interpretation is correct; no court seems to have addressed the
issue. A comparison of the grammatical structures of Article 6 and Article
15, however, appears to support the more restrictive interpretation: although
both focus on the law in force at the time a crime was committed-Article 6
in terms of sentence; Article 15 in terms of criminalization-Article 15 spe-
cifically expands that law to include "national or international law," while
Article 6 does not." 6 According to the traditional canon of interpretation
209 ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 6(2).
"' See id. art. 15 ("Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable
at the time when the criminal offence was committed.").
211 See Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 373-74.
22 See IHT Statute art. 24(Fifth).
213 Id. art. 14(Fourth).
214 See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 15(1) ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal of-
fence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.").
215 See, e.g., William Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and the Death
Penalty, 60 ALBANY L. REv. 733, 737 (1997).
216 Compare ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 6(2) ("[S]entence of death may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission
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inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, therefore, Article 6 should not be read to
include international law.
D. Appeals
Article 6 of the ICCPR provides that "[a]nyone sentenced to death
shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Am-
nesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all
cases."2 '7 Under the IHT Statute, however, condemned defendants have no
such right: Article 27 specifically provides that "[n]o authority, including
the President of the Republic, may grant a pardon or mitigate the punish-
ment issued by the Court. 218
It is worth noting that, in its present form, Article 27 actually repre-
sents a step backward from earlier versions of the IHT Statute. The Decem-
ber 10, 2003 version, for example, provided that "[s]entences shall be car-
ried out by the legal system of Iraq in accordance with its laws"229-a criti-
cal difference, because Paragraph 286 of the Code, which the current Article
27 supercedes, specifically gave the president the power to commute a death
sentence or pardon the condemned defendant.2
V. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Art. 14(1) of the ICCPR guarantees all defendants "a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law." To be independent
and impartial, a tribunal must be both structurally and practically autono-
mous from the Executive; as the Human Rights Committee noted in Ba-
hamonde v. Equatorial Guinea:
"[A] situation where the functions and competences of the judiciary and
executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able to con-
trol or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an independent
of the crime.") with id art. 15(1) ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed.") (emphasis added).
2.7 Id. art. 6(4).
28 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal art. 27(2).
29 The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Dec. 10, 2003, art. 27 (Iraq), available at
http://www.cpairaq.org/human-rights/Statute.htm.
See ICCP para. 286 ("If the Court of Cassation confirms the death sentence as issued, it
will send the case file to the Minister of Justice, who is responsible for passing it on to the
President of the Republic to seek the necessary decree for carrying out the sentence. The
President of the Republic issues the decree for carrying out the sentence, or for commuting it,
or for pardoning the condemned person.").
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and impartial tribunal within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant.2 '
Three provisions of the IHT Statute are fundamentally inconsistent
with the impartiality and independence of the Tribunal: (1) Executive trans-
fer of judges; (2) judicial transfer of cases; and (3) disqualification of judges
through de-Ba'athification.
A. Executive Transfer of Judges
Article 4(Fourth) of IHT Statute specifically permits the Presidency
222Council to remove a judge from the Tribunal "for any reason" whatsoever.
That authority, which is unreviewable,223 obviously represents the kind of
Executive ability to "control or direct" the Judiciary that the ICCPR prohib-
its. Indeed, the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary spe-
cifically provide that "[j]udges shall be subject to suspension or removal
only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to dis-
charge their duties, 24 and that "[t]he assignment of cases to judges within
the court to which they belong is an internal matter of judicial administra-
tion.,,225
Even worse, Paragraph 4 was clearly included in the Statute in or-
der to give the Iraqi government control over the IHT. The government
claims that the paragraph is necessary to prevent biased judges from presid-
ing over the Tribunal. 26 That claim, however, is unconvincing. Earlier ver-
sions of the Statute did not give the government the power to remove judges
at will,27 and Rule 8 has always permitted "any party" to a trial to "file a
request to the cassation panel, boosted by a legal evidence, for the disquali-
221 Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No. 468/1991, 10 Nov. 1993,
CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991, 9.4; see also Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judici-
ary, No. 4 available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-comp50.htm [hereinafter Basic
Principles on Independence] ("There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interfer-
ence with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revi-
sion.").
"' Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art.4(Fourth) ("The Presidency Council in accor-
dance with a proposal from the Council of Ministers shall have the right to transfer Judges
and Public Prosecutors from the Court to the Higher Judicial Council for any reason.").
2' Cf id. art. 8(Eight) ("The decisions of the Investigative Judge can be appealed in cass-
ation before the Cassation Panel within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notification or
from the date notification is considered received pursuant to law.").
24 Basic Principles on Independence, supra note 221, no. 18.
22. Id. no. 14 (emphasis added).
... See Human Rights Watch, Removal of a Judge a Grave Threat to Independence of
Genocide Court (Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/09/19/
iraq14229.htm.
222 See Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal (Dec. 10, 2003), art. 5.
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fication of a Judge" 2 -- a motion that the cassation panel must decide in
three days.2 9 The only difference between the two provisions is that, unlike
Article 4(Fourth), Rule 8 entrusts the obligation to ensure unbiased judges
to the judiciary itself. Article 4(Fourth) is only necessary, therefore, insofar
as the Iraqi government believes that it should have the right to second-
guess the IHT's control of its own judges-a blatant infringement on the
Tribunal's independence.
B. Judicial Transfer of Cases
Equally problematic is Article 29 of the IHT Statute, which pro-
vides that "[a]t any stage of the proceedings, the Court may demand of any
other Iraqi court to transfer any case being tried by it involving any crimes
stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 of this statue, and such court shall
be required to transfer such case upon demand., 23° Although the Basic Prin-
ciples state that "[t]here shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted inter-
ference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts
be subject to revision,"23' Article 29 effectively gives the IHT the authority
to revise every decision by every other Iraqi court for any reason whatso-
ever. That authority distorts the concept of judicial independence232 beyond
recognition.233
Article 29 is also antithetical to Article 14's guarantee of an "impar-
tial" tribunal. The Basic Principles provide that "[t]he judiciary shall decide
matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with
the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pres-
sures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any
228 IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL R. P. & EVID. 8.
229 ld.
230 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 29(3).
Basic Principles on Independence, supra note 221, no. 4.
232 Article 14's guarantee of an independent tribunal normally concerns Executive interfer-
ence, but its language is general enough to prohibit intra-judicial interference, as well. The
same is true of the Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary. As the Honorable
Justice Michael Kirby has pointed out, "[o]ne aspect of judicial independence which is often
overlooked is that judges must also be independent from each other. A proper system of
judicial administration will provide for presiding judges and court officials to organize the
business of the members of courts and tribunals efficiently, economically and justly as be-
tween different members." The Hon Justice Michael Kirby, address at the Human Rights
Institute Conference in Hong Kong: Independence of the Judiciary-Basic Principle, New
Challenges (June 12-14, 1998), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/
kirbyjabahk.htm.
... This raises an additional question: namely, what happens when the IHT takes over a
trial that is already in progress-or one that has already led to an acquittal? Are the pre-trial
and trial decisions of the other court res judicata for the IHT?. Does the acquittal trigger
Article 30's ne bis in idem provisions? Or can the IHT simply try the defendant again, a
second proverbial bite of the apple? Perhaps not surprisingly, Article 29 fails to address these
questions.
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reason."234 It is difficult to imagine a more direct interference with a judge's
ability to act impartially than the omnipresent threat that, at "any stage of
the proceedings," the IHT can take the case away from him for any reason
whatsoever--or even for no reason at all.235
C. Disqualification of Ba 'athists
Article 33 of the IHT Statute provides that "[n]o person who was
previously a member of the disbanded Ba'ath Party shall be appointed as a
judge [or] investigative judge., 236 That provision infringes upon the inde-
pendence of the IHT in two critical respects. To begin with, it represents yet
another example of non-judicial control over the IHT, this time by the legis-
lative branch.237 Although the National De-Ba'athification Commission is
supposed to "coordinate" its functions with the judiciary,238 the mandatory
language of Article 33 means that, in practice, the Commission can dictate
the IFHT's judicial roster-especially given that, in violation of the Basic
Principles,2 39 a judge removed for alleged membership in the Ba'ath Party is
not entitled to either a fair hearing on the charges or independent review of
the Commission's decision.2 0
Article 33 also undermines the independence of the HIT by creating
an irrebuttable presumption that any judge who was a member of the Ba'ath
Party is unable to fulfill his professional obligations. Basic Principle No. 18
provides that "U]udges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for
reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their
234 Basic Principles on Independence, supra note 221, no. 2.
.. Cf Kirby, supra note 232 ("But in the performance of the central role of decision-
making, a member of a court or tribunal will not be independent if he or she can be directed
by a superior colleague on how to decide a matter. Nor will the judge enjoy independence of
mind if he or she can be effectively removed from the performance of the judicial function
by the simple expedient of rostering the judge off work.").
236 Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, art. 33.
23 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iraq art. 131 (First) (noting that the Com-
mission "shall be attached to the Council of Representatives"), full text of English translation
by the United Nation's Office of Constitutional Support approved by the Iraqi government
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/lO/12/AR200510
1201450.html.
See id.
"9 See Basic Principles on Independence, supra note 221, nos. 17, 20. Although Principle
20 says that independent review is not required for decisions by the legislature in impeach-
ment hearings or hearings of similar gravity, the De-Ba'athification Commission is a legisla-
tive commission, not the legislature itself.
240 Indeed, Judge al-Hammashi was removed from the Dujail trial even though the De-
Ba'athification Commission withdrew the allegations against him. See Human Rights Watch,
Judging Dujail, supra note 5, at 39.
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duties., 24' Although some Ba'athist judges may well be "unfit to discharge
their duties" on account of their party membership, Article 33's categorical
exclusion of former Ba'athists is unacceptably overbroad-as Bassiouni
points out, "many Ba'ath party members were only registered as a matter of
expediency and did not play an active role in the party, 242 while others suf-
fered at the hands of the Ba'athists despite their party membership. 3
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As its critics predicted, the IHT did not provide Saddam and his co-
defendants with a fair trial. That failure is regrettable, but it is not surpris-
ing-a trial is only as fair as the law it applies, and this essay has shown that
the Tribunal's substantive and procedural law violates international due
process at every stage of criminal proceedings, from the earliest moments of
the investigation to the final confirmation of a death sentence.
Given its many flaws, it is tempting to conclude that the IHT should
be replaced by an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal, as a number of scholars have
argued.2" Such arguments, however, overlook the fact that Iraq has always
insisted on trying those responsible for the atrocities committed by Sad-
dam's regime in its domestic courts-and has every sovereign right to do
so.
That said, there is no excuse for the IHT's systematic failure to pro-
vide defendants with the rights guaranteed by international due process-
rights that are binding upon Iraq as a State party to the ICCPR. As the Du-
jail trial demonstrates, the IHT's substantive and procedural failings are not
just hypothetical; in practice, they have combined to produce what can be
most accurately described as bad political theater.
The real question, then, is not how to replace the IHT, but how to
improve it.245 Keeping in mind that "a de facto solution is not a substitution
for a legislative solution, because what is controlling is the text of the Stat-
241 Office of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, 18 (Dec. 13, 1985) available at http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-comp
50.htm.
2 Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 371 n.243.
243 Id. at371.
" See, e.g., Shany,, supra note 12, at 345 ("The best way to overcome these schizophrenic
tendencies would be for the Governing Council to generously use its power to appoint inter-
national judges and advisors, so as to bring about the internationalization of the IST and its
transformation into a hybrid court."); Ryan Swift, Occupational Jurisdiction: A Critical
Analysis of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 19 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 99, 136-37 (2006) (noting that
the advantages of hybrid tribunals, "coupled with the problems associated with having Iraqis
conduct these trials, lead to the conclusion that justice would be better served by a hybrid
tribunal instead of the IST").
... See Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 388.
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ute and not the de facto corrections that occured, 246 the following changes
to the IHT's substantive and procedural law are necessary:
A. Substantive Law
o Article 14 should be amended to clearly indicate the actus reus and mens
rea required for each of the domestic crimes.
B. Procedural Law
o Ideally, Rule 27 should be amended to require the presence of counsel
during any interrogation of a suspect, even prior to detention or arrest. At a
minimum, the Rule should require counsel during any post-detention or
post-arrest interrogation. Either way, the Rule should make clear that the
right to counsel applies regardless of whether the interrogation is being con-
ducted by the investigative judge or by an appointed investigator.
* Rule 27 should also be amended to guarantee a suspect's right to remain
silent not only during questioning by an investigative judge, but during any
interrogation by a law enforcement official. Moreover, the Rule should spe-
cifically require that suspects be informed of this right.
o Rule 24 should be amended to give the decision to detain a suspect to a
judge other than the investigative judge who investigated the suspect. If that
is too significant a reform, the detention standard should be raised from
"may have committed" a crime to "reasonable grounds to believe" a crime
was committed.
o Rule 25 should be amended to make clear that the Tribunal has the au-
thority to review an investigative judge's initial decision to detain a suspect.
o Rule 40 should be amended to clarify that the Prosecutor cannot use evi-
dence previously protected from disclosure at trial without sufficient ad-
vance notice to the defense.
o Rule 43 should be amended to require all exculpatory information be
disclosed to the defense regardless of whether it was provided to the Prose-
cutor in confidence. In the alternative, the Rule should allow the Tribunal to
draw exculpatory inferences from non-disclosure, along the lines of Article
72 of the ICC Statute.
o Article 20 should be amended to require the Tribunal to review the suffi-
ciency of the indictment prior to trial, instead of after the prosecution's
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case-in-chief. If that is not acceptable, the December 10, 2003 version of the
article should be restored, requiring the chief investigative judge to review
the sufficiency of the indictment. In the latter case, the article should also
make clear that the Tribunal cannot add new charges to the original indict-
ment at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief.
* A Rule should be added regarding trials in absentia that makes clear: (1)
the burden of proof is on the Prosecutor to show that the defendant did not
appear at trial because he was trying to evade justice; and (2) the defendant
is entitled to a new trial once he is located.
o Rule 57 should be amended--or a new Rule should be added-to prohibit
the Tribunal from basing its judgment on any statement by a witness that
the defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine either prior to
trial or in open court.
* Rule 30 should be amended, along the lines of ICTY Rule 44, to require
all attorneys- appointed or otherwise-to possess competence in interna-
tional criminal law and have significant experience in criminal proceedings.
* Article 21 should be amended to require the Tribunal to protect defense
attorneys as well as victims and witnesses.
* Article 19 should be amended to clarify that the presumption of inno-
cence requires the Prosecutor to prove the defendant's guilt either beyond a
reasonable doubt or to the judges' "innermost conviction."
* Article 24 should be amended to provide specific penalties for the crimes
contained in Articles 11, 12, and 13 that do not have domestic Iraqi coun-
terparts.
* Article 24 should also be amended to permit the death penalty only for
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide that were com-
mitted intentionally and led to the loss of life or other "extremely grave con-
sequences.247
* The December 10, 2003 version of Article 27 should be restored, permit-
ting the president of Iraq to exercise his traditional authority to commute a
death sentence or pardon the defendant.
24' This recommendation presumes, of course, that the Iraqi government will continue to
insist on its right to impose the death penalty, regardless of whether doing so violates Article
15 of the ICCPR's prohibition on retroactive penalties.
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C. Judicial Independence
e Article 4 should be deleted, leaving Rule 8 as the sole method for remov-
ing a biased judge from the Tribunal.
9 Article 29 should either be deleted or amended to make clear that dis-
agreement with the decisions of another court does not justify the IHT as-
suming control of a case.
e Article 33 should either be deleted or amended to disqualify only those
judges whose activities as members of the Ba'ath Party can reasonably be
assumed to undermine their impartiality.
These suggestions are both significant and numerous. Given the
damage that the Saddam trial has done to the IHT's legitimacy, however,
they are necessary. The IHT should remain an Iraqi tribunal, but it must
become one that respects basic norms of international due process. As Bas-
siouni has reminded us, "[legality should never be cast lightly aside, no
matter how atrocious the violation or how abhorrent the violator. 24 ' The
IHT is no exception.
248 M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need for a Specialized Conven-
tion, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 471 (1994).
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